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ABSTRACT
Online users generate tremendous amounts of textual informa-
tion by participating in different activities, such as writing reviews
and sharing tweets. This textual data provides opportunities for
researchers and business partners to study and understand indi-
viduals. However, this user-generated textual data not only can
reveal the identity of the user but also may contain individual’s
private information (e.g., age, location, gender). Hence, "you are
what you write" as the saying goes. Publishing the textual data thus
compromises the privacy of individuals who provided it. The need
arises for data publishers to protect people’s privacy by anonymiz-
ing the data before publishing it. It is challenging to design effective
anonymization techniques for textual information which minimizes
the chances of re-identification and does not contain users’ sensitive
information (high privacy) while retaining the semantic meaning
of the data for given tasks (high utility). In this paper, we study
this problem and propose a novel double privacy preserving text
representation learning framework,DPText, which learns a textual
representation that (1) is differentially private, (2) does not contain
private information and (3) retains high utility for the given task.
Evaluating on two natural language processing tasks, i.e., sentiment
analysis and part of speech tagging, we show the effectiveness of
this approach in terms of preserving both privacy and utility.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1Textual information is one of the most significant portions of data
that users generate by participating in different online activities
such as leaving online reviews, and posting tweets. On one hand,
textual data consists of abundant information about users’ behavior,
1This is an extended version of the original paper published as a poster paper in the
proceedings of the 30th ACM Conference on Hypertext and Social Media (Hyper-
Text’19) [13]
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preferences and needs which is critical for understanding individu-
als by profiling them at unprecedented scales. For example, data
consumers such as service providers and business partners, use tex-
tual data to study customers’ behaviors, track users’ responses to
products, advertise more efficiently, and provide personalized ser-
vices to users according to their needs. Textual data has been used
in many tasks such as sentiment analysis, part-of-speech tagging
and information extraction and retrieval [31]. Textual data thus has
tremendous usages by various data consumers and have become
one of the profitable resources for data publisher [1, 51].
On the other hand, publishing intact user-generated textual data
makes users vulnerable against privacy issues. The reason is that
the textual data itself contains sufficient information that allows
people in the textual database to be re-identified [9, 11, 50] and
leaks their private attribute information [15, 43, 48]. Thus, "you are
what you write" as the saying goes. Take the following tweet as an
example:
Dr.appt Tuesday morning was told I need to lose 30 pounds by
X-Mas, have high cholesterol, and high blood pressure. Today
starting counting calories #myfitnesspal and juicing for dinner2
This user may not be aware that the sensitive medical condi-
tion information can be easily inferred from this post– exposing
symptoms of Diabetes. If intact users’ textual data is available, a
malicious data consumer (or any potential adversary) can easily
infer lots of sensitive and private information from text that users’
do not explicitly disclose such as vacation plans, medical condi-
tions, age and location [15, 31]. Another privacy issue arises when
a malicious data consumer attempts to re-identify the identity of
an individual in the database by investigating whether a targeted
user’s textual data is in the database or inferring which record is
associated with it. Therefore, publishing complete and intact users’
textual data risks exposing their privacy by allowing an adversary
to figure out what they are.
These users’ privacy concerns, therefore, mandate data publish-
ers to protect privacy by anonymizing the data before sharing it
with data consumers. The ultimate goal of an anonymization ap-
proach is to preserve user privacy while ensuring the utility of the
published data for future tasks and usages. One straightforward
technique is to remove “Personally Identifiable Information” (a.k.a.
PII) such as names and users’ IDs. This solution has shown to be
insufficient to protect people’s privacy. Examples of insufficien-
cies are the anonymized dataset published for the Netflix prize
challenge [44] and the AOL search data leak [7] in which users
were re-identified according to their reviews and search queries,
2The tweet is real, however, we altered it to preserve the privacy of the user.
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respectively. Various protection techniques for structured data have
been developed over the years such as k-anonymity and differential
privacy. However, traditional privacy preserving techniques are in-
efficient for user-generated textual data because this data is highly
unstructured, noisy and unlike traditional documental content, con-
sists of large numbers of short and informal posts [25]. Moreover,
these works may impose a significant utility loss for protecting
textual data as they may not explicitly include utility into the design
objective of the privacy protection model. It is thus challenging
to design effective anonymization techniques for user-generated
textual data which preserves both privacy and utility.
To address the aforementioned challenges, we propose a double
privacy preserving text representation learning framework, called
DPText. The proposed framework seeks to learn a privacy pre-
served text representation so that 1) a malicious data consumer (or
any potential adversary) cannot infer whether or not a target text
representation is in the dataset, 2) the adversary cannot deduce
users’ private attribute from the learned representation, and 3) the
semantic meaning of the original textual information is still pre-
served in the learned representation. The learned privacy preserved
textual information will be then shared with data consumers.
Our double privacy preserving framework protects individuals’
privacy against identity re-identification and leakage of private
information. Inspired by the recent success in adversarial learn-
ing [27], we build DPText through an integrated process which
consists of an auto-encoder, a differential-privacy-based noise adder
and two discriminator-learning components (illustrated in Figure 1).
We deploy a document auto-encoder to extract latent representa-
tion of the original text’s content. The noise adder then adds noise
to the text representation by adopting a Laplacian mechanism in
order to guarantee differential privacy. Although guaranteeing dif-
ferential privacy minimizes the chances of revealing whether or
not a target text representation is in the database, it cannot prevent
the adversary from learning user’s private information. Moreover,
adding too much noise can destroy the semantic meaning of the
textual information. To infer the amount of added noise w.r.t. these
constraints, we utilize two discriminators that regularize the noise
adding process by incorporating necessary constraints. First, we
incorporate a semantic discriminator to ensure that the semantic
meaning of the perturbed text representation is preserved w.r.t.
the given task (e.g., classification). Second, we introduce a private
attribute discriminator to ensure that the perturbed representation
does not contain private attributes.
In essence, we investigate the following challenges: 1) How
should textual representation be perturbed to ensure that differen-
tial privacy is preserved?, 2) How could we control the amount of
the added noise so that the semanticmeaning of the text is preserved
w.r.t the given task? and 3) How could we handle the amount of the
added noise so that the user’s private attributes are obscured? Our
solution to these challenges results in a novel framework DPText.
Our main contributions are summarized as:
• We study the problem of text annonymization by learning a differ-
entially private representation that prevents text reconstruction
and re-identification by minimizing the chance of attacker to
infer whether target text representation is in the database;
• We provide a principled way to learn a textual representation
that does not contain users’ private attribute information while
retaining the utility for a given task; and
• We theoretically show that the learned representation is dif-
ferentially private which confirms DPText minimizes the re-
identification chance. We also conduct experiments on real-world
datasets to demonstrate the effectiveness of DPText in two im-
portant natural language processing tasks, i.e., sentiment pre-
diction and part-of-speech (POS) tagging. Our empirical results
show that DPText is able to keep the semantic meaning while
obscuring private attribute information.
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider an environment with three parties: online users, data
publishers, and data consumers. Users generate textual information
via various online activities such as posting online information,
tweeting and writing reviews. These information are all collected
by data publishers for future usage. A data publisher can be a social
media service provider such as Twitter or Facebook or a third-party
data company who partners with social media platforms and has
access to users’ information [51]. For example, DataSift3 is a third-
party company that has access to Twitter’s Firehost engine and thus
accesses to complete and intact Twitter data including users’ tweets.
The data publisher can share the collected and anonymize data to
data consumers according to users’ consent and privacy policies.
Data consumers obtain user-generated data by sending requests to
data publishers and then use the textual data for understanding in-
dividuals at unprecedented scales. Business providers, government
agencies and researchers are examples of data consumers. Note
that data consumers may not be able to obtain complete and intact
user-generated textual data without the support of data publisher.
As we discussed earlier, textual information is rich in content. It
can leak users’ privacy by allowing users’ in the textual database
to be re-identified [50] and leaking their private attribute informa-
tion [15, 43]. Our focus in this paper is to design an effective text
anonymiztion technique for the data publisher to preserve users’
privacy by preventing a potential adversary (i.e., malicious data
consumer) from breaching privacy of users while maintaining the
utility of their textual information for future tasks.
Let X = {x1, ...,xN } denotes a set of N documents and P =
{p1, ...,pT } denotes a set ofT private and sensitive attributes. Each
documentxi is composed of a sequence ofwords, i.e.,xi = {x1i , ...,xmi }.
We denote zi ∈ Rd×1 as the latent representation of the original
document xi . We would like to use xi in the given task T (e.g.,
classification). However, we want to preserve users’ privacy by pre-
venting a potential adversary from inferring whether a target text
representation is in the dataset or which record is associated with it
or being able to learn the target users’ private attribute information.
Thus, in this paper, we study the following problem:
Problem 1. Given a set of documents X, set of sensitive attributes
P, and given task T , learn a function f that can generate and release
a manipulated latent representation z˜i , for each document xi so that,
1) the adversary cannot re-identify a targeted text representation and
infer whether or not this latent representation is in the database, 2) the
3https://datasift.com/
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adversary cannot infer the targeted user’s private attributes P from
the generated representation z˜i , and 3) the generated representation
z˜i is good for the given task T , i.e., z˜i = f (xi ,P,T).
Note that in our work, the goal is to achieve a protection against
possible attacks of malicious data consumers who have access to
the released textual information, but not against the system (i.e.,
text representation learner) which we assume is trusted.
3 BACKGROUND
Here, we review the technical preliminaries of differential privacy
which is required for the rest of the discussion. Differential privacy
is a powerful technique which protects a user’s privacy during sta-
tistical query over a database by minimizing the chance of privacy
leakage while maximizing the accuracy of queries [23]. Differential
privacy provides a strong privacy guarantee.The intuition behind
differential privacy is that the risk of user’s privacy leakage should
not increase as a result of participating in a database [23]. Differen-
tial privacy guarantees that existence of an instance in the database
does not pose a threat to its privacy as the statistical information of
data would not change significantly in comparison to the case that
the instance is absent [23]. This makes it harder for the adversary
to re-identify an instance and infer whether the instance is in the
database or not or decide which record is associated with it [35].
We denote an algorithm with privacy property byAp , which is ran-
domized so that the re-identification of the data on the adversary’s
side is very difficult. Differential privacy can be formally defined:
Definition 1. ϵ - Differential Privacy. An algorithm Ap is
ϵ-differential private if for any subset of outputs R and for all datasets
D1 and D2 differing in at most one element:
P(Ap (D1) ∈ R)
P(Ap (D2) ∈ R) ≤ e
ϵ (1)
where Ap (D1) and Ap (D2) are the outputs of the algorithm for
input datasets D1 and D1, respectively and P is the randomness of
the noise in the algorithm.
Here ϵ is called privacy budget and it can be also shown that Eq.
1 is equivalent to |log ( P (Ap (D1)=rP (Ap (D2)=r ) | ≤ ϵ for some point r in the
output range. Note that larger values of ϵ (e.g., 10) results in larger
privacy loss while smaller values (e.g., ϵ ≤ 0.1) indicate the opposite.
For example, a small ϵ means that the output probabilities of D1
andD2 at r are very similar to each other which demonstrates more
privacy. According to Dwork et al. [24], an uncertainty should be
introduced in the output of a function (i.e., algorithm) to be able
to hide the participation of an individual in the database. This is
quantified by sensitivity, which is the amount of the change in the
output of functionA made by a single data point in the worst case:
Definition 2. L1-sensitivity. TheL1-sensitivity of a vector-valued
functionA is the maximum change in the L1 norm of the value of the
functionA when one input changes. More formally, the L1-sensitivity
∆(A) if A is defined as [24]:
∆(A) = max
X,X′
|X−X′ |=1
∥A(X) − A(X′)∥1 (2)
where X and X′ are two datasets differ in one entry. Next, we
discuss the details of our proposed framework DPText.
4 THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
Here, we discuss the details of double privacy preserving text rep-
resentation learning framework. We illustrate the entire model in
Figure 1. This framework consists of four major components: 1) an
auto-encoder for text representation, 2) differential-privacy-based
noise adder, 3) a semantic meaning discriminator, and 4) a private at-
tribute discriminator. The auto-encoder A aims to learn the content
representation of a document by minimizing the reconstruction er-
ror. Then, the differential-privacy-based noise adder adds a random
noise, i.e., Laplacian noise, to the original text representation w.r.t.
a given privacy budget to further satisfy the differential privacy
guarantee. Since adding noise neither preserves semantic meaning
nor necessarily prevents leakage of private attributes, semantic
meaning and private attributes discriminators are utilized to infer
the amount of the added noise. The semantic meaning discrimina-
tor DS ensures that the added noise does not destroy the semantic
meaning w.r.t. a given task. The private attribute discriminator DP
also guides the amount of added noise by ensuring that the manip-
ulated representation does not include users’ private information.
Note that we assume that the framework is trusted and therefore
everything to the left of the privacy barrier (the red dashed line in
Figure 1) including the original textual information and intermedi-
ate results, are kept private. The final learned representation which
is to the right of the privacy barrier is released to the public. The
final output 1) is differentially private, 2) obscures private attribute
information, and 3) preserves semantic meaning.
4.1 Extracting Textual Representation
Here, we demonstrate how to extract the content representation for
a given document. Let x = {x1, ...,xm } be a textual document with
m words. Auto-encoder has been widely utilized for text generation
and has shown to be effective recently [17, 21]. We therefore use an
auto-encoder A to extract content representation z from document
x . Let EA : X → Z be an encoder that can infer the content repre-
sentation z for a given document x , and DA : Z → X be a decoder
that reconstruct the document from its learned representation.
Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) have been shown to be ef-
fective for summarizing and learning semantic of unstructured
noisy short texts [21, 47]. In this work, we apply RNN as the en-
coder to learn the latent representation of texts. RNN can learn a
probability distribution over a sequence by being trained to pre-
dict the next symbol in a sequence. The RNN consists of a hidden
state S and an optional output which operates on a word sequence
x = {x1, ...,xm }. At each time step t , the hidden state st of RNN is
updated by,
st = fenc (st−1,xt ) (3)
After reading the end of the given document, we use the last
hidden state of the RNN as the representation vector z ∈ Rd×1 of
the document x . We employ the gated recurrent unit (GRU) as the
cell type to build the RNN, which is designed in a manner to have
a more persisted memory [21]. Let θe denotes the parameters for
the encoder EA. Then we will have:
z = EA(x ,θe ) (4)
Decoder xˆ = DA(z,θd ) takes z as the input to start the generation
process and θd denotes the parameters for the decoder DA. We use
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Figure 1: The framework of DPText architecture. It consists of four components, a document auto-encoder, a differential-
privacy-based noise adder, a semantic meaning discriminator and a private attribute discriminator. We assume that DPText
is trusted. Red dashed line shows the privacy barrier and everything to the left of it (i.e., the original data and intermediate
results) are kept private. The final learned noisy representation to the right of the privacy barrier is released to the public.
This output is a noisy representation which is differentially private, hides private information and has semantic meaning.
another RNN to build the decoder DA to generate the output word
sequence xˆ = {xˆ1, .., xˆm }. At each time step t , the hidden state of
the decoder is computed as:
st = fdec (st−1, xˆt ) (5)
where s0 = z. The two components of the proposed auto-encoder
are jointly trained tominimize the negative conditional log-likelihood
for all documents. We use the trained auto-encoder EA to obtain
the content representation z ∈ Rd×1 according to Eq. 4 where d is
the size of textual representation.
4.2 Preventing Text Re-identification and
Reconstruction by Adding Noise
Textual information is rich in content and publishing this data with-
out proper anonymization lead to privacy breach and revealing
the identity of an individual. This can let the adversary infer if a
targeted user’s latent textual representation is in the database or
which record is associated with it. Moreover, publishing a docu-
ment’s latent representation could result in leakage of the original
text. In fact, recent advancement in adversarial machine learning
shows that it is possible to recover the input textual information
from its latent representation [30]. In this case, if an adversary
has preliminary knowledge of the training model, they can readily
reverse engineer the input, for example, by a GAN attack algo-
rithm [30]. It is thus essential to protect the textual information
before publishing it.
Differential privacy is a powerful technique for preserving pri-
vacy of users’ data included in a database and provides a privacy
guarantee. Our method is inspired by Chaudhuri et al. [20], where
the differential privacy is achieved through adding a random noise,
i.e., Laplacian noise, to the output of an algorithm A. This mecha-
nism is known as output perturbation and it has been proved that
under certain conditions this output perturbation mechanism will
guarantee differential privacy [20].
The main idea of the output perturbation mechanism is to add
noise to the output of an algorithm to preserve its privacy. In our
problem, the output is the original document latent representation
z. The benefit of adding noise to this latent representation is two
fold. First, it minimizes the chance of the re-identification of learned
text representation by preventing the adversary to infer whether or
not a target representation is in the database, and second, it makes
it difficult for the adversary to recover the raw textual data. The
goal here is thus to add noise to the output such that the differential
privacy condition is satisfied. Laplacian mechanism is a popular
way to add noise to preserve differential privacy. In particular, with
Laplacian mechanism, we perturb the output z by adding Laplacian
noise to it as follows:
z˜(i) = z(i) + s(i), s(i) ∼ Lap(b), b = ∆
ϵ
, i = 1, ..,d (6)
where ϵ is the privacy budget, ∆ is the L1-sensitivity of the latent
representation z, d the dimension of z, s the noise vector, s(i) and
z(i) are the i-th element for vectors s and z, respectively. ∆ = 2d
(see details in Section 5). Note that each element of the noise vector
is drawn from Laplacian distribution.
4.3 Preserving Semantic Meaning
Perturbing the latent representation of the given text by adding
noise to it (Eq. 6) prevents the adversary from re-constructing the
text from its latent representation and guarantees differential pri-
vacy. However, this approach may destroy the semantic meaning of
the text data. Semantic meaning is task-dependant, e.g., classifica-
tion is one of the common tasks. In the case of sentiment analysis,
sentiment is of semantic meaning in the given text and sentiment
prediction is a classification task. In order to preserve the semantic
meaning of the textual representation, we need to add an optimal
amount of noise to the text latent representation which does not
destroy the semantic meaning of the text data while ensuring data
privacy. We approach this challenge by learning the amount of
the added noise with the privacy budget ϵ in terms of training a
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classifier:
yˆ = so f tmax(z˜;θDS ) (7)
where θDS are the weights associated with the softmax function
and yˆ represents the inferred label for the classification.
To preserve the semantic meaning of the text representation,
we seek a noisy latent representation which retains high utility
and accordingly contains enough information for a downstream
task, e.g., classification. We define a semantic discriminator DS that
aims to assign a correct class label to the perturbed representation,
whose loss function is minimized as follows,
min
θDS ,ϵ
L(yˆ,y) = min
θDS ,ϵ
C∑
i=1
−y(i) log yˆ(i) (8)
where C is the number of classes, and L denotes the cross entropy
loss function. The one-hot encoding of the ground truth label for
the classification task is also denoted by y and y(i) represents the
i-th element of y, i.e., the ground truth label for i-th class.
To learn the value of the privacy budget ϵ , we employ the com-
monly used reparameterization trick [36]. Instead of directly sam-
pling noise s(i) from Laplacian distribution (i.e., Eq. 6), this trick
first samples a value r from a uniform distribution, i.e. r ∼ [0, 1],
and then rewrites the amount of added noise s(i) as follows:
s(i) = −∆
ϵ
× sдn(r ) ln(1 − 2|r |), i = 1, 2, ..,d (9)
This is equivalent to sampling noise s from Lap(∆ϵ ). The advantage
of doing so is that the parameter ϵ is now explicitly involved in
the representation of the added noise, s, which makes it possible to
use back-propagation to find the optimal value of ϵ . Large privacy
budget ϵ could result in large privacy bounds. Hence, we add a
constraint, ϵ < c1 where c1 is a predefined constraint.
Another challenge here is that, yˆ is inferred from z˜ after intro-
ducing noise to the original latent representation z. The noise is
also sampled from the Laplacian distribution which results in large
variance in the training process. To solve this issue and make the
model more robust, we sample K copies of noise for each given
document. In other words, we can rewrite Eq. 8 as follows:
min
θDS ,ϵ
LDS (yˆ,y) = minθDS ,ϵ
1
K
K∑
k=1
L(yˆk ,y) = (10)
min
θDS ,ϵ
1
K
K∑
k=1
C∑
i=1
−y(i) log yˆk (i) s .t . ϵ ≤ c1
where the goal is to minimize loss function LDS w.r.t. the param-
eters {θDS , ϵ}, and yˆk = so f tmax(z˜k ;θDS ). Note that z˜k = z + sk
in which sk is the k-th sample of the noise calculated with Eq. 9.
4.4 Protecting Private Information
We discuss how adding noise to the latent representation of the text
can prevent adversary from learning the input textual information
and guarantee differential privacy. Another important aspect of
learning privacy preserving text representation is to ensure that
sensitive and private information of the users such as age, gender,
and location is not captured in the latent representation.
An adversary cannot design a private attribute inference attack
better than what it has already anticipated. In this spirit, we lever-
age the idea of adversarial learning. In particular, we seek to train
a private attribute discriminator DP that can accurately identify the
private information from the given representation, while learning a
representation that can fool the discriminator and minimize leakage
of private attribute w.r.t. the determined adversary, which results
in a representation that does not contain sensitive information. As-
sume that there are T private attributes (e.g., age, gender, location).
Let pt represents the ground truth (i.e., correct label) for the t-th
sensitive attribute and θDtP demonstrates the parameters of discrim-
inator model DP for the t-th sensitive attribute. The adversarial
learning can be formally written as:
min
{θDtP }
T
t=1
max
ϵ
LDP = min{θDtP }
T
t=1
max
ϵ
1
K .T
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
LDtP (pˆ
k
t ,pt ), s .t . ϵ ≤ c1
(11)
where LDtP denotes the cross entropy loss function and pˆ
k
t =
so f tmax(z˜k ,θDtP ) is the predicted t-th sensitive attribute using
the k-th sample. The outer minimization finds the strongest private
attribute inference attack and the inner maximization seeks to fool
the discriminator by obscuring private information.
4.5 DPText - Learning the Text Representation
In the previous sections, we discuss how we can (1) add noise to
prevent the adversary from reconstructing the original text from
the latent representation andminimize the chance of privacy breach
by satisfying differential privacy (Eq. 6), (2) control the amount of
the added noise to preserve the semantic meaning of the textual
information for a given task (Eq. 10), and (3) control the amount
of the added noise so that user’s private information is masked
(Eq. 11). Inspired by the idea of adversarial learning, we achieve all
three by modeling the objective function as a minmax game among
the two introduced discriminators as follows:
min
θDS ,ϵ
max
{θDtP }
T
t=1
LDS − αLDP = (12)
min
θDS ,ϵ
max
{θDtP }
T
t=1
1
K
K∑
k=1
[
L(yˆk ,y) − α 1
T
T∑
t=1
LDtP (pˆ
k
t ,pt )
]
, s .t . ϵ ≤ c1
where α controls the contribution of the private attribute discrim-
inator in the learning process. This objective function seeks to
minimize privacy leakage w.r.t. the attack, minimize loss in the
semantic meaning of the textual representation, and protect private
information. With N documents, Eq. 12 is written as follows:
min
θDS ,ϵ
max
{θDtP }
T
t=1
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
1
K
K∑
k=1
[
L(yˆkn ,yn )− (13)
α
1
T
T∑
t=1
LDtP (pˆ
k
n,t ,pn,t )
] ]
+ λΩ(θ ) s .t . ϵ ≤ c1
where θ = {θDS , ϵ, {θDtP }
T
t=1} is the set of all parameters to be
learned, Ω(θ ) is the regularizer for the parameters such as Frobenius
norm and λ is a scalar to control the amount of contribution of the
regularization Ω(θ ).
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Algorithm 1 The Learning Process of DPText model
Input: Training data X, θDS , ϵ , {θDtP }
T
t=1, batch size b, c1 and α .
Output: The privacy preserving learned text representation z˜
1: Pre-train the document auto-encoder EA to obtain the text
representations according to Eq. 4 as z = EA(x ,θe )
2: repeat
3: Sample a mini-batch of b samples {x i }bi=1 from X
4: Add noise s to initial document representation zi and get the
new document representation z˜i , i = 1, 2, ...,b via Eq.9
5: Train semantic discriminator DS by gradient descent(Eq.10)
6: Train private attribute discriminator DP via Eq.11.
7: until Convergence
The aim of this objective function is to perturb the original
text representation by adding a proper amount of noise to it in
order to prevent an adversary from inferring existence of the target
textual representation in the database, reconstructing the user’s
original text and learning user’s sensitive information from the
latent representation, while preserving the semantic meaning of
the perturbed representation for a given specific task. We stress
that the resultant text representation satisfies ϵ˜-differential privacy,
where ϵ˜ ≤ c1 is the optimal learned privacy budget. This is further
discussed in Section. 5.
4.6 Optimization Algorithm
The optimization process is illustrated in Algorithm 1. First, we com-
pute the latent representation of all documentsZ = {zi , ..., zN } in
Line 1. We then sample a mini-batch of b samples from the training
data and add noise to initial to initial text representation. Next, we
train the semantic discriminator DS in Line 5 and private attribute
discriminator in Line 6. Recall that we have a constraint on the
variable ϵ , i.e., ϵ < c1. To satisfy this constraint, we use the idea of
the projected gradient descent [18] wherein the gradient descent is
performed one step, i.e. ϵ −γ × ϵ where γ is the learning rate. Then,
the parameter ϵ is projected back to the constraint. This means that
if ϵ > c1, then we set ϵ = c1, otherwise, keep the value of ϵ . The
final noisy representation z˜ can be then calculated for each given
document according to the value of optimal learned privacy budget
ϵ˜ ≤ c1 using Eq. 6. Note that any model can be used for semantic
and private attribute discriminators.
5 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
Here, we show that the learned text representation using DPText
is ϵ˜-differential privacy where ϵ˜ ≤ c1 is the learned optimal privacy
budget. In particular, we prove the privacy guarantee for the final
noisy latent representation z˜ for each given document. The theoret-
ical findings confirm the fact that DPText minimizes the chance of
revealing existence of textual representations in the database.
Theorem 1. Let ϵ˜ ≤ c1 be the optimal value learned for the
privacy budget variable ϵ w.r.t the semantic meaning and private
attribute discriminators. Let zi be the original latent representation
for document xi , i = 1, ...,N inferred using Eq. 4 and. Moreover, let ∆
denotes the L1-sensitivity of the textual latent representation extractor
function discussed in Section. 4.1. If each element si (l), l = 1, ...,d in
noise vector si is selected randomly from Lap(∆ϵ˜ ) (∆ = 2d), the final
noisy latent representation z˜i = zi + si satisfies ϵ˜-differential privacy.
Proof. First we bound the change of z when one data point in
the database changes. This gives the L1-sensitivity of the textual
latent representation extractor function discussed in Section. 4.1.
Recall the way z is calculated using Eq. 4. Function tanh is used in
GRU to build the RNNwhich is used in Section. 4.1 to find the latent
representation of a given document. The output of tanh function
is within range [−1, 1]. This indicates that value of each element
z(l), l = 1, ...,d in the latent representation vector z is within range
[−1, 1]. If one data point changes (i.e., removed from the database),
the maximum change in value of each element z(l) is 2. Since the
dimension of z is d , the maximum change in the L1 norm of z
happens when all of its elements, z(l), have the maximum change.
According to Definition. 2, the L1-sensitivity of z is ∆ = 2 × d .
Now, assume that ϵ˜ ≤ c1 is the optimal value for the learned
privacy budget. Then each element in s (i.e., s(l), l = 1, 2, ...d) is
distributed as Lap(∆ϵ˜ ) based on Eq. 6 which is equal to randomly
picking each s(l) from the Lap(∆ϵ˜ ) distribution, whose probability
density function is Pr (s(l)) = ϵ˜2∆e−
ϵ˜ |s(l )|
∆ .
Let D1 and D2 be any two datasets only differ in the value of
one record. Without loss of generality we assume that the repre-
sentation of the last document is changed from zn to z′n . Since the
L1-sensitivity of z is ∆ = 2d , then ∥zn − z′n ∥1 ≤ ∆. Then we have:
Pr [zn + sn = r |D1]
Pr [z′n + s′n = r |D2]
=
∏
l ∈{1,2, ...,d } Pr (r − zn (l))∏
l ∈{1,2, ...,d } Pr (r − z′n (l))
(14)
=
∏
l ∈{1,2, ...,d } Pr (sn (l))∏
l ∈{1,2, ...,d } Pr (s′n (l))
= e−
ϵ˜
∑
l |sn (l )|
∆ /e−
ϵ˜
∑
l |s′n (l )|
∆
= e
ϵ˜
∑
l (|s′n (l )|−|sn (l )|)
∆ ≤ e
ϵ˜
∑
l |s′n (l )−sn (l )|
∆ = e
ϵ˜ ∥s′n−sn ∥1
∆
where sn and s′n are the corresponding noise vectors with respect to
the learned ϵ˜ when the input areD1 andD2, respectively. The first
inequality also follows from the triangle inequality, i.e. |a | − |b | ≤
|a − b |. The last equality follows from the definition of L1-norm.
Since we have sn = r − zn and s′n = r − z′n , we can write:
∥s′n − sn ∥1 = ∥(r − z′n ) − (r − zn )∥1 = ∥z′n − zn ∥1 ≤ ∆ (15)
This follows from the definition of L1-sensitivity. We rewrite Eq. 14:
Pr [zn + sn = r |D1]
Pr [z′n + s′n = r |D2]
≤ e ϵ˜ ∥s
′
n−sn ∥1
∆ ≤ e ϵ˜∆∆ = e ϵ˜ (16)
So, the theorem follows and the final noisy latent representation
is ϵ˜-differentially private. □
6 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we conduct experiments on real-world data to
demonstrate the effectiveness of DPText in terms of preserving
both privacy of users and utility of the resultant representation for
a given task. Specifically, we aim to answer the following questions:
• Q1 - Utility: Does the learned text representation preserve the
semantic meaning of the original text for a given task?
• Q2 - Privacy: Does the learned text representation obscure users’
private information?
• Q3 - Utility-Privacy Relation: Does the improvement in privacy
of learned text representation result in sacrificing the utility?
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To answer the first question (Q1), we report experimental results for
DPTextw.r.t. twowell known text-related tasks, i.e., sentiment anal-
ysis and part-of-speech (POS) tagging. Sentiment analysis and POS
tagging have many applications in Web and user-behavioral mod-
eling [32, 34]. Recent research showed how linguistic features such
as sentiment are highly correlated with users demographic informa-
tion [31, 46]. Another group of research shows the effectiveness of
POS tags in predicting users’ age and gender information [43]. This
makes users vulnerable against inference of their private informa-
tion. Therefore, to answer the second question (Q2), we consider
different private information, i.e., age, location, and gender, and
report results for private attribute prediction task. To answer the
third question (Q3), we investigate the utility loss against privacy
improvement of the learned text representation.
6.1 Task 1: Sentiment Analysis
Sentiment analysis is one of the important language processing
applications. Next, we describe the used dataset and model.
6.1.1 Data. We use a dataset from TrustPilot 4 from Hovy et
al. [31]. On their website, users can write reviews and leave a one
to five star rating. Users can also provide some demographic in-
formation.In the collected dataset, each review is associated with
three attributes, gender (male/female), age, and location (Denmark,
France, United Kingdom, and United States). We follow the same
approach as in [39] and discard all non-English reviews based on
LANGID.PY5 [40], and only keep reviews classified as English with
a confidence greater than 0.9. We follow the setting of [32] and
categorize age attribute into three groups, over-45, under-35, and
between 35 and 45. We follow the setting of [40] and subsample 10k
reviews for each location to balance the five locations.We consider
each review’s rating score as the target sentiment class.
6.1.2 Model and Parameter Settings. For the document auto-encoder
A, we use single-layer RNN with GRU cell of input/hidden dimen-
sion with d=64. For semantic and private attribute discriminators,
we use feed-forward networks with single hidden layer with the
dimension of hidden state set as 200, and a sigmoid output layer,
which is determined through grid search. The parameters α and λ
are determined through cross-validation, and are set as α = 1 and
λ = 0.01. The upper-bound constraint c1 for the value of parameter
ϵ is also set as c1 = 0.1 to ensure the ϵ-differential privacy, ϵ = 0.1
for the learned representation. Note that exploring the best sen-
timent predictor is not the focus of our work and it can be easily
replaced by different models designed for this task.
6.2 Task 2: Part-of-speech (POS) Tagging
POS tagging is another language processing application which is
framed as a sequence tagging problem [31].
6.2.1 Data. For this task we use a manually POS tagged version
of TrustPilot dataset in English. This data is obtained from Hovy
et al. [32] and consists of 600 sentences, each tagged with POS
information based on the Google Universal POS tagset [45] and
also labeled with both gender and age of the users. The gender
attribute is categorized into male and female, and age attribute
4http://trustpilot.com
5https://github.com/saffsd/langid.py
is categorized into two groups over-45, under-35. We follow the
setting of [39] and use Web English Tree-bank (WebEng) [16] as
a pre-training tagging model because of the small quantity of text
available for this task. WebEng is similar to TrustPilot datasets w.r.t.
the domain as both contains unedited user generated textual data.
6.2.2 Model and Parameter Settings. Similar to the sentiment anal-
ysis task, we use single-layer RNN with GRU cell of input/hidden
dimension with d=64 for document auto-encoder A. For semantic
discriminator (i.e., POS tag predictor), we use bi-directional LSTM:
hi = LSTM(x i , hi−1;θh ), h′i = LSTM(x i , h′i+1;θ ′h ) (17)
yi = Cateдorical(ϕ([hi ; h′i ]);θ0)
where x i |mi=1 is the input sequence with m words, hi is the i-th
hidden state, h0 and h′m+1 are terminal hidden states set to zero,[.; .] denotes vectors concatenation and ϕ is a linear transformation.
The dimension of the hidden layer is set as 200. We apply a dropout
rate of 0.5 to all hidden layers during training.
For the private attribute discriminator, we use feed-forward net-
works with single hidden layer with the dimension of hidden state
set as 200, and a sigmoid output layer (determined via grid search).
The input to this network is final hidden representation [hm ; h′0].
For hyperparameters, we set values of α and λ as α = 1 and λ = 0.01
which are determined through cross-validation. The upper-bound
constraint for the value of ϵ is also set as c1 = 0.1. Note that explor-
ing the best POS tagger is not the focus of our work and it can be
easily replaced by different models designed for this task.
6.3 Experimental Design
We perform 10-fold cross validation for POS tagging and sentiment
analysis tasks. We follow state-of-the-art research and report accu-
racy score to evaluate the utility of the generated data for the given
POS tagging [19, 32] or sentiment analysis task [22]. In particular,
for the sentiment prediction task, we report accuracy for correctly
predicting rating of reviews. We also report tagging accuracy for
POS tagging task. To examine the text representation in terms of
obscuring private attributes, we report test performance in terms
of F1 score for predicting private attributes. Note that the private
attributes for sentiment task include age, gender and location while
private attributes for tagging task include gender and age.
We compare DPText in both tasks with the following baselines:
• Original: This is a variant of DPText and publishes the orig-
inal representation z without adding noise or utilizing DS and
DP discriminators.
• DifPriv: This baseline adds Laplacian noise to the original repre-
sentation z according to Eq. 6 (i.e., Lap(∆ϵ ), ϵ = 0.1, ∆ = 2d) with-
out utilizing DS and DP discriminators. Note that this method
makes the final representation ϵ-differentially private. We com-
pare our model against this method to investigate the effective-
ness of semantic and private attribute discriminators.
• ADV-ALL [39]: This method utilizes the idea of adversarial learn-
ing and has two components, generator, discriminator. It gener-
ates a text representation that has high quality for the given task
but has poor quality for inference of private attributes.
In both tasks, semantic discriminator DS is trained on the train
data and applied to test data for predicting sentiment and POS tags.
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(a) Sentiment Prediction Task
Model Sentiment Private Attribute (F1)(Acc) Age Loc Gen
Original 0.7493 0.3449 0.1539 0.5301
DifPriv 0.7397 0.3177 0.1411 0.5118
ADV-ALL 0.7165 0.3076 0.1080 0.4716
DPText 0.7318 0.1994 0.0581 0.3911
(b) POS Tagging Task
Model POS Tagging Private Attribute (F1)(Acc) Age Gen
Original 0.8913 0.4018 0.5627
DifPriv 0.8982 0.3911 0.5417
ADV-ALL 0.8901 0.3514 0.5008
DPText 0.9257 0.2218 0.3865
Table 1: Accuracy for sentiment prediction and POS tagging
and F1 for evaluating private attribute prediction task.
Similarly, we can apply private attribute discriminator DP where it
plays the role of an adversary trying to infer the private attributes
of the user based on the textual representation. Private attribute
discriminator DP is also trained on the train data and applied to
test data for evaluation. Higher accuracy score for semantic dis-
criminator DS indicates that representation has high utility for the
given task, while lower F1 score for private attribute discriminator
DP demonstrates that the textual representation has higher privacy
for individuals due to obscuring their private information.
6.4 Experimental Results
6.4.1 Performance Comparison. For evaluating the quality of the
learned text representation, we answer questions Q1, Q2 and Q3
for two different natural language processing tasks, i.e., sentiment
prediction and POS tagging. The experimental results for different
methods are demonstrated in Table 1.
Utility (Q1). The results of sentiment prediction for DPText is
comparable to the Original approach. This means that the repre-
sentation byDPText preserves the semantic meaning of the textual
representation according to the given task (i.e., high utility). Dif-
Priv performs significantly better than DPText and the reason is
that DPText applies noise at least as strong as DifPriv (or even
more). Therefore, adding more noise results in bigger utility loss.
We also observe that DPText has better performance in terms of
predicting sentiment in comparison to ADV-ALL.
The accuracy of POS tagging task is higher when DPText is
utilized rather than when Original is used. This is because POS
tagging results are biased toward gender, age and location [32, 34].
In other words, this information affects the performance of tagging
task. Removing private information from the latent representation
results in removing this type of bias for tagging task. Therefore,
the learned representation is more robust and results in a more
accurate tagging. DPText also has better performance than Dif-
Priv due to removal of private information and thus bias. Besides,
results demonstrate that DPText outperforms ADV-ALL. These
results indicate the effectiveness of DPText in preserving semantic
meaning of the learned text representation.
(a) Sentiment Prediction Task
Model Sentiment Private Attribute (F1)(Acc) Age Loc Gen
DPText 0.7318 0.1994 0.0581 0.3911
DPTextAge 0.7573 0.2248 0.1012 0.3982
DPTextLoc 0.7360 0.2861 0.0731 0.4100
DPTextGen 0.7347 0.2997 0.0623 0.4053
(b) POS Tagging Task
Model POS Tagging Private Attribute (F1)(Acc) Age Gen
DPText 0.9257 0.2218 0.3865
DPTextAge 0.9218 0.2111 0.4179
DPTextGen 0.9361 0.2412 0.3916
Table 2: Impact of different private attribute discriminators
on DPText for sentiment prediction and POS tagging tasks.
Privacy (Q2). In the sentiment prediction task, DPText has sig-
nificantly lower F1 score in comparison to Original and thus
outperforms Original in terms of obscuring private information.
DPText has significantly better performance in hiding private in-
formation than DifPriv. This indicates that solely adding noise and
satisfying ϵ-differential privacy does not protect textual informa-
tion against leakage of private attributes. This further demonstrates
the importance of private attribute discriminator DP in obscuring
users’ private information. We also observe that the learned textual
representation via DPText hides more private information than
ADV-ALL (lower F1 score). These results indicate that DPText can
successfully obscure private information.
In the POS tagging task, F1 scores of DPText are significantly
lower thanOriginal approach. These results demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of DPText in obscuring users’ private attribute. Similarly,
comparing F1 scores of DPText and DifPriv shows that DPText
contains less private attribute information. This confirms the inca-
pability of DifPriv in obscuring users’ private information, and
clearly shows the effectiveness of private attribute discriminator
DP . Moreover, DPText outperforms ADV-ALL method in terms
of hiding user’s age and gender information. It confirms that the
learned textual latent representation by DPText preserves privacy
by eliminating their sensitive information w.r.t. POS tagging task.
Utility-Privacy Relation (Q3). For the sentiment prediction task,
DPText has achieved the highest accuracy and thus reached the
highest utility in comparison to other methods. It also has com-
parable utility results to Original. However, Original utility is
preserved at the expense of significant privacy loss. Moreover, al-
though DifPriv satisfies differential privacy and its performance
is comparable with DPText for predicting sentiment, it performs
poorly in obscuring private information. DifPriv may provide
weaker privacy guaranty comparing with DPText since learned
ϵ in DPText can be smaller than ϵ = 0.1 in DifPriv. In contrast,
DPText has significantly better (best) results in terms of privacy
compared to the other approaches and also achieves the least utility
loss in comparison to ADV-ALL. For the POS tagging task, the
resultant representation from DPText achieves the highest utility
and privacy amongst all approaches. This shows the effectiveness
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of DPText in preserving semantic meaning and obscuring private
information for more accurate tagging.
The results for two natural language processing tasks indicate
thatDPText learns a textual representation that (1) does not contain
private information, and (2) preserves the semantic meaning of the
representation for the given task.
6.4.2 Impact of Different Components. In this subsection, we in-
vestigate the impact of different private attribute discriminators on
obscuring users’ private information. To achieve this goal, we define
three variants of the proposed framework, i.e.,DPText{Age/Gen/Loc}.
In each of these variants, the model is trained with discriminator
of just one of the private attributes. For example, DPTextAge is
trained solely with age discriminator and does not use any other
private attribute discriminators during training phase. The perfor-
mance comparison is shown in Table 2.
In sentiment prediction task, we observe that using solely one
of the private attribute discriminators can result in a representa-
tion which performs better in terms of sentiment prediction, in
comparison to DPText in which we use all three private attributes
discriminators (i.e., higher utility). However, these variants perform
poorly in terms of obscuring private attributes in comparison to
the original DPText model. These results indicate that although
using one discriminator in the training process can help in preserv-
ing more semantic, it can compromise the effectiveness of learned
representation in obscuring attributes.
In the POS tagging task, results show that DPText achieves the
best performance in tagging task (i.e., higher utility) in comparison
to other methods that solely use one of the private attribute dis-
criminators. The reason is that presence of age and gender related
information in the text can negatively affect the tagging perfor-
mance due to existing bias [32, 34]. DPText is thus more effec-
tive in removing this bias and leads to more accurate tagging in
comparison to DPTextAge and DPTextGen. Similar to sentiment
prediction task, we observe that DPTextGen with only gender
attribute discriminator is less effective than DPText in terms of
hiding private attributes information. DPTextAge however, has
the best results in terms of obscuring age attribute information.
6.4.3 Parameter Analysis. DPText has one important parameter α
which controls the contribution from private attribute discrimina-
tor DP . We investigate the effect of this parameter by varying it as
{0.125, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16}. Original-{Age/Gen/Loc} shows the
results for the corresponding task when the original text represen-
tation has been utilized. Results are shown in the Fig. 2.(a-b) and
Fig. 2.(c-d) for sentiment prediction and POS tagging, respectively.
Although α controls the contribution of private attribute discrim-
inator, we surprisingly observe that in both sentiment prediction
and POS tagging tasks with the increase of α , the F1 scores for
prediction of different private attributes decrease at first up to the
point that α = 1 and then it increases. This means that the private
attributes were obscured more accurately at the beginning with the
increase of α and less later. Moreover, with the increase of α , the
accuracy of sentiment prediction task decreases. This shows that
increasing the contribution of private attribute discriminator lead
to decrease in the utility of resultant text representation. In case of
POS tagging, the accuracy first increases and then decreases after
α = 1. This shows that removing the age and gender attributes
related information results in removing the bias from learned text
representation and improve the tagging task. However, after α = 1
the utility of resultant representation decreases. Those patterns are
useful for selecting the value of parameter α in practice.
Moreover, in both tasks, setting α = 0.125 results in an im-
provement in terms of the amount of hidden private information in
comparison to the results of using Original representation. This
observation supports the importance of the private attribute dis-
criminator. Another observation is that, after α = 1, continuously
increasing α degrades the performance of hiding private attributes
(i.e., increasing F1 scores) in both sentiment prediction and POS
tagging tasks. This is because the model could overfit by increasing
α which lead to an inaccurate learned text representation in terms
of preserving private attributes and semantic meaning of the text.
7 RELATEDWORK
Explosive growth of the Web not only has drastically changed the
way people conduct activities and acquire information, but also has
raised numerous challenges [10, 12] including security [2–5] and
privacy [8, 11, 14] issues for them. Identifying and mitigating user
privacy issues has been studied from different aspects on the Web
and social media (for a comprehensive survey see [9]). Our work
is related to a number of research which we discuss below while
highlighting the differences between our work and them.
Differential Privacy Application in Social Media. Differential
privacy has been used for many privacy preserving applications. For
example, ϵ-differential privacy has been used to preserve privacy
in graph data [49]. Another application of differential privacy is
in recommendation systems that it is utilized to construct private
covariance matrices [41] and private users’ sensitive ratings [42].
Privacy Preserving Web Search. The search engine returns a
list of web pages according to a user’s query formed by one or
more keywords. Privacy preserving web search approaches focus
on anonymizing users search queries. One group of works focused
on the protection of post-hoc logs [28, 37, 51]. Korolova et al. [37]
releases a (ϵ,δ )-differential private query click graph. The work
of Zhang et al. [51] makes a significant improvement over [37] by
providing an (ϵ)-differential privacy. Another set of works includes
client-side ones focuses on search query obfuscation [26, 33] which
adds dummy search queries (collected from popular websites and
searched query terms) on behalf of users.Beigi et al. [8] also pro-
poses a method for preserving web browsing history by inferring
how many and what links should be added to a user’s browsing
history to preserve his privacy while retaining the utility.
Preserving privacy of text is more challenging than web search
privacy preserving since queries often include few keywords while
text data consists of much larger numbers of words.
Textual Data Anonymization. Few works consider the privacy
of textual user data [6, 29, 39, 50]. The work of [29] introduces
possible privacy threats of document repositories, 1) name entity
recognition, and 2) author identification. It then introduces the
concept of k-author anonymity to address the latter issue. How-
ever, this work failed to provide technical solutions to address the
privacy challenges. Another work from Anandan et al. [6] studies
removing PII from text. It first introduces t-Plausibility notion and
then propose information theoretic based algorithms which select
and generalize sensitive keywords to satisfy t-Plausibility. Its is that
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(a) Private attribute prediction w.r.t. senti-
ment task (F1)
(b) Sentiment prediction (Acc) (c) Private attribute prediction w.r.t. pos
tagging (F1)
(d) POS tagging prediction (Acc)
Figure 2: Performance results for private attribute and sentiment prediction tasks for different values of α
it does not address textual representation re-identification and re-
moval of hidden private information. The work of Zhang et al. [50]
introduces a verified version of differential privacy specified for tex-
tual data to overcome the curse of dimensionality problem, namely,
ϵ-TextIndistinguishability and satisfy it by adding Laplacian noise.
Another work [39] uses the idea of adversarial learning to generate
text representation. Their framework consists of a generator which
generates representation w.r.t. given task and a discriminator which
ensures the representation does not contain private information.
Our work is different from [39, 50]. First, [50] does not consider
the task that given text will be used for. This results in a represen-
tation which lacks utility in practice. Moreover, this framework
does not handle leakage of private attribute. However, the semantic
and private attribute discriminators in DPText ensure the utility
and privacy. Second, in [39] the input textual information could
be recovered from the representation if the adversary has prelim-
inary knowledge of the training model and this could be done
easily through reverse engineering by a GAN attack algorithm [30].
Moreover, [39] does not consider the risk of text representation
re-identification, while DPText does. DPText does not depend on
the process of generating original representation and this repre-
sentation could be generated via any model such as doc2vec [38].
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a double privacy preserving text repre-
sentation learning framework, DPText, which learns a text repre-
sentation that (1) is differentially private, (2) obscures users’ private
information, and (3) retains high utility for a given task. It has four
main components, 1) an auto-encoder, 2) differential-privacy-based
noise adder, 3) a semantic meaning discriminator, and 4) a private
attribute discriminator. Our theoretical and empirical results shows
the effectiveness of DPText in minimizing chances of learned tex-
tual representation re-identification, obscuring private attribute
information and preserving semantic meaning of the text. One fu-
ture direction for this work is to generate privacy preserving text
(e.g., sentences, paragraphs) rather than laten representation which
is critical for having interpretable results. We also adopt Laplacian
noise rather than Guassian noise as it provides stronger guarantees
for differential privacy. Another future direction is to adopt Gauss-
ian noise to satisfy differential privacy and further examine how
it affects obscuring private attribute information and preserving
semantic meaning of data. It would also be interesting to generalize
the proposed model for other types of data, e.g., location traces.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This material is based upon the work supported, in part, by NSF
#1614576, ARO W911NF-15-1-0328 and ONR N00014-17-1-2605.
REFERENCES
[1] [n. d.]. How does Twitter make money? https://www.bbc.com/news/
business-24397472. Accessed: 2013-11-07.
[2] Hamidreza Alvari, Elham Shaabani, Soumajyoti Sarkar, Ghazaleh Beigi, and Paulo
Shakarian. 2019. Less is More: Semi-Supervised Causal Inference for Detecting
Pathogenic Users in Social Media. In Companion Proceedings of The 2019 World
Wide Web Conference. ACM, 154–161.
[3] Hamidreza Alvari, Elham Shaabani, and Paulo Shakarian. 2018. Early Identifi-
cation of Pathogenic Social Media Accounts. In IEEE Intelligence and Security
Informatics (ISI). IEEE.
[4] Hamidreza Alvari and Paulo Shakarian. 2019. Hawkes Process for Understanding
the Influence of Pathogenic Social Media Accounts. In 2019 2nd International
Conference on Data Intelligence and Security (ICDIS). IEEE.
[5] Hamidreza Alvari, Paulo Shakarian, and JE Kelly Snyder. 2017. Semi-supervised
learning for detecting human trafficking. Security Informatics 6, 1 (2017), 1.
[6] Balamurugan Anandan, Chris Clifton, Wei Jiang, Mummoorthy Murugesan,
Pedro Pastrana-Camacho, and Luo Si. 2012. t-Plausibility: Generalizing Words to
Desensitize Text. Transactions on Data Privacy 5, 3 (2012), 505–534.
[7] Michael Barbaro, Tom Zeller, and Saul Hansell. 2006. A face is exposed for AOL
searcher no. 4417749. New York Times 9, 2008 (2006), 8.
[8] Ghazaleh Beigi, Ruocheng Guo, Alexander Nou, Yanchao Zhang, and Huan Liu.
2019. Protecting user privacy: An approach for untraceable web browsing history
and unambiguous user profiles. In Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM International
Conference on Web Search and Data Mining. ACM, 213–221.
[9] Ghazaleh Beigi and Huan Liu. 2018. Privacy in social media: Identification,
mitigation and applications. arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.02191 (2018).
[10] Ghazaleh Beigi and Huan Liu. 2018. Similar but different: Exploiting usersâĂŹ
congruity for recommendation systems. In International Conference on Social
Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling and Prediction and Behavior Represen-
tation in Modeling and Simulation. Springer, 129–140.
[11] Ghazaleh Beigi and Huan Liu. 2019. "Identifying Novel Privacy Issues of Online
Users on Social Media Platforms" by Ghazaleh Beigi and Huan Liu with Martin
Vesely As Coordinator. SIGWEB Newsl. Winter, Article 4 (Feb. 2019), 7 pages.
[12] Ghazaleh Beigi, Suhas Ranganath, and Huan Liu. 2019. Signed Link Prediction
with Sparse Data: The Role of Personality Information. In Companion Proceedings
of The 2019 World Wide Web Conference. ACM, 1270–1278.
[13] Ghazaleh Beigi, Kai Shu, Ruocheng Guo, Suhang Wang, and Huan Liu. 2019.
Privacy Preserving Text Representation Learning. In Proceedings of the 30th on
Hypertext and Social Media (HT ’19). ACM.
[14] Ghazaleh Beigi, Kai Shu, Yanchao Zhang, and Huan Liu. 2018. Securing social
media user data: An adversarial approach. In Proceedings of the 29th on Hypertext
and Social Media. ACM, 165–173.
[15] Valentina Beretta, Daniele Maccagnola, Timothy Cribbin, and Enza Messina.
2015. An interactive method for inferring demographic attributes in Twitter. In
Proceedings of the 26th ACM Conference on Hypertext & Social Media. ACM.
[16] Ann Bies, Justin Mott, ColinWarner, and Seth Kulick. 2012. English web treebank.
Linguistic Data Consortium, Philadelphia, PA (2012).
[17] Samuel R Bowman, Luke Vilnis, Oriol Vinyals, Andrew M Dai, Rafal Jozefowicz,
and Samy Bengio. 2015. Generating sentences from a continuous space. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1511.06349 (2015).
[18] Stephen Boyd and Lieven Vandenberghe. 2004. Convex optimization. Cambridge
university press.
[19] Thorsten Brants. 2000. TnT: a statistical part-of-speech tagger. In Proceedings of
the sixth conference on Applied natural language processing. ACL, 224–231.
Privacy Preserving Text Representation Learning WOODSTOCK’19, 2019
[20] Kamalika Chaudhuri, Claire Monteleoni, and Anand D Sarwate. 2011. Differen-
tially private empirical risk minimization. In JMLR, Vol. 12.
[21] Kyunghyun Cho, Bart Van Merriënboer, Caglar Gulcehre, Dzmitry Bahdanau,
Fethi Bougares, Holger Schwenk, and Yoshua Bengio. 2014. Learning phrase
representations using RNN encoder-decoder for statistical machine translation.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1406.1078 (2014).
[22] Cicero dos Santos and Maira Gatti. 2014. Deep convolutional neural networks
for sentiment analysis of short texts. In Proceedings of Computational Linguistics.
[23] Cynthia Dwork. 2008. Differential privacy: A survey of results. In International
Conference on Theory and Applications of Models of Computation. Springer, 1–19.
[24] Cynthia Dwork, Aaron Roth, et al. 2014. The algorithmic foundations of differ-
ential privacy. Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science (2014).
[25] Benjamin CM Fung, K Wang, R Chen, and S Yu Philip. 2010. Privacy-preserving
data publishing: A survey of recent developments. Comput. Surveys 42, 4 (2010).
[26] Arthur Gervais, Reza Shokri, Adish Singla, Srdjan Capkun, and Vincent Lenders.
2014. Quantifying web-search privacy. In Proceedings of ACM SIGSAC on CCS.
[27] Ian Goodfellow, Jean Pouget-Abadie, Mehdi Mirza, Bing Xu, David Warde-Farley,
Sherjil Ozair, Aaron Courville, and Yoshua Bengio. 2014. Generative adversarial
nets. In Advances in neural information processing systems. 2672–2680.
[28] Michaela Gotz, Ashwin Machanavajjhala, Guozhang Wang, Xiaokui Xiao, and
Johannes Gehrke. 2012. Publishing search logs a comparative study of privacy
guarantees. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering 24, 3 (2012).
[29] Dilek Hakkini-Tur, GËĘkhan Tur, et al. 2006. Sanitization and anonymization of
document repositories. In Web and information security. IGI Global, 133–148.
[30] Briland Hitaj, Giuseppe Ateniese, and Fernando Perez-Cruz. 2017. Deep models
under the GAN: information leakage from collaborative deep learning. In Pro-
ceedings of ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security.
[31] Dirk Hovy, Anders Johannsen, and Anders Søgaard. 2015. User review sites as a
resource for large-scale sociolinguistic studies. In Proceedings of WWW.
[32] Dirk Hovy and Anders Søgaard. 2015. Tagging performance correlates with
author age. In Proceedings of ACL.
[33] Daniel C Howe and Helen Nissenbaum. 2009. TrackMeNot: Resisting surveillance
in web search. Lessons from the Identity trail: Anonymity, privacy, and identity in
a networked society 23 (2009), 417–436.
[34] Anna Jørgensen, Dirk Hovy, and Anders Søgaard. 2016. Learning a POS tagger
for AAVE-like language. In Proceedings of ACL: Human Language Technologies.
[35] Daniel Kifer and Ashwin Machanavajjhala. 2011. No free lunch in data privacy.
In Proceedings of ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Management of data.
[36] Diederik P Kingma and Max Welling. 2013. Auto-encoding variational bayes.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6114 (2013).
[37] Aleksandra Korolova, Krishnaram Kenthapadi, Nina Mishra, and Alexandros
Ntoulas. 2009. Releasing search queries and clicks privately. In WWW.
[38] Quoc Le and Tomas Mikolov. 2014. Distributed representations of sentences and
documents. In International Conference on Machine Learning. 1188–1196.
[39] Yitong Li, Timothy Baldwin, and Trevor Cohn. 2018. Towards Robust and Privacy-
preserving Text Representations. (2018).
[40] Marco Lui and Timothy Baldwin. 2012. langid. py: An off-the-shelf language
identification tool. In Proceedings of the ACL 2012 system demonstrations.
[41] Frank McSherry and Ilya Mironov. 2009. Differentially private recommender
systems: building privacy into the net. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM SIGKDD.
[42] Xuying Meng, Suhang Wang, Kai Shu, Jundong Li, Bo Chen, Huan Liu, and
Yujun Zhang. 2018. Personalized privacy-preserving social recommendation. In
Proceedings of Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
[43] Arjun Mukherjee and Bing Liu. 2010. Improving gender classification of blog
authors. In Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ACL EMNLP.
[44] Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov. 2008. Robust de-anonymization of
large sparse datasets. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
[45] Slav Petrov, Dipanjan Das, and RyanMcDonald. 2012. A Universal Part-of-Speech
Tagset. In Proceedings of Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC).
[46] Martin Potthast, Francisco Rangel, Michael Tschuggnall, Efstathios Stamatatos,
Paolo Rosso, and Benno Stein. 2017. Overview of PAN’17. In International Con-
ference of the Cross-Language Evaluation Forum for European Languages.
[47] Lifeng Shang, Zhengdong Lu, and Hang Li. 2015. Neural responding machine for
short-text conversation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1503.02364 (2015).
[48] Svitlana Volkova, Yoram Bachrach, Michael Armstrong, and Vijay Sharma. 2015.
Inferring Latent User Properties from Texts Published in Social Media.. In Pro-
ceedings of Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
[49] Qian Xiao, Rui Chen, and Kian-Lee Tan. 2014. Differentially private network
data release via structural inference. In Proceedings of the 20th ACM SIGKDD.
[50] Jinxue Zhang, Jingchao Sun, Rui Zhang, and Yanchao Zhang. 2018. Privacy-
Preserving Social Media Data Outsourcing. In Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM.
[51] Sicong Zhang, Hui Yang, and Lisa Singh. 2016. Anonymizing query logs by
differential privacy. In Proceedings of ACM SIGIR.
